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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AVAILABILITY OF
CHALLENGES TO AN INTERNAL REVENUE SUMMONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Internal Revenue Service has been granted broad investigatory
powers in order to determine the correct tax liability of individuals and organizations by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. One of the tools available to the Internal Revenue Service is the internal revenue summons. The

authority for the internal revenue summons is provided by section 7602 of the
Internal Revenue Code.'

It is the purpose of this comment to discuss several of the challenges
which may be asserted to defeat a summons issued pursuant to section 7602
of the Internal Revenue Code. The comment will also deal with the cir-

cumstances in which the taxpayer under investigation may intervene to
challenge a summons issued to a third party who has knowledge or is in possession of records which may shed light on the taxpayer's possible tax liability. However, before examining these challenges and the taxpayer's inter-

vention, it will be useful to outline the procedure which is set in motion when
an internal revenue summons is issued.
Service of the summons must be accomplished by

"...

the Secretary

or his delegate by an attested copy delivered in hand to the person to whom
it is directed, or left at his lasf and usual place of abode .... -2 Although
the Internal Revenue Code provides that the Internal Revenue Service may
issue and serve the summons, it does not provide that the summons may be
3
administratively enforced by the Internal Revenue Service.
If the addressee of the summons does not comply, the Government must
1. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7602:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where none has been made . . . or collecting any liability, the Secretary
or his delegate is authorized(1)
To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be
relevant or material to such inquiry;
(2)
To summon the person liable for tax . . . or any person having
possession, custody, or care of books of account relating to the business of the person liable for tax . . . or any other person the Secretary or his delegate may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary
or his delegate at a time and place named in the summons and to
produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such
testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry; and
(3)
To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may
be relevant or material to such inquiry.
2. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7603.
3. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 524 (1971); Reisman v. Caplin,
375 U.S. 440, 445 (1964).
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look to the district court wherein the addressee resides or is found for enforcement of the summons. Section 7604(a) provides:
If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify, or to produce books, papers, records, or other data,
the United States district court for the district in which such person
resides or is found shall have jurisdiction by appropriate process to
compel such attendance, testimony, or production of books, papers,
records or other data.4
As should be noted, this section provides that the district court "shall have
jurisdiction by appropriate process. . . ." However, neither section 7604(a)
nor any other section of the Internal Revenue Code defines "appropriate
process". Therefore, it has been held that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply. 5 Since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that civil
proceedings must be initiated by filing a complaint, 6 it has been argued that
the Government has proceeded improperly where it has petitioned the district court for an order to show cause why the addressee should not be compelled to comply with the summons. 7 The authority for this contention is
founded on a footnote appearing in United States v. Powell,8 which noted
that the proceedings to judicially enforce the summons are "instituted by
filing a complaint, followed by answer and hearing."
However, lower federal courts have pointed out that the word "complaint", as used in the Powell footnote, is not to be read literally so as to prohibit the Government from proceeding by way of petition for an order to
show cause. In Wild v. United States,10 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that the addressees of an Internal Revenue summons had been
shown no prejudice where the Government had proceeded by way of petition
and obtained an order to show cause. The court held that this procedure
provided the addressee of the summons with all of the rights to which he was
entitled, including, ". . . an opportunity to answer . . . and a hearing.""'
Thus, the procedural setting in which most challenges to the Internal Revenue Service summons are made is the federal district court hearing on the
order to show cause why the addressee should not be compelled to comply
12
with the summons.
4. See, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7402(b) which is substantially identical to
§ 7604(a).
5. Martin v. Chandis Securities Co., 128 F.2d 731, 734 (9th Cir. 1942).
6. Fed. R. Civ. P. 3.
7. United States v. Ruggeiro, 300 F. Supp. 968, 971 (C.D. Cal. 1969) afI'd,
425 F.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 922 (1970).
8. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
9. Id. at 58, n.18.
10. 362 F.2d 206, 209 (9th Cir. 1966); accord, United States v. Ruggeiro,
300 F. Supp. 968, 971 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
11. Id.
12. It is well settled that a judicial order which enforces an internal revenue
summons is appealable. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964); accord, United
States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 523 (2nd Cir. 1968).
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II.

INTERVENTION

Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the Internal Revenue Service to summon either the taxpayer whose tax liability is under investigation or ". . . any other person the Secretary or his delegate may deem
proper." The question is thus raised as to what circumstances justify the
taxpayer under investigation to intervene and challenge a summons issued to
a third person who has information or is in possession of records which may
shed light on the taxpayer's tax liability. In 1971, the United States Supreme
Court decided Donaldson v. United States."3 In so doing, the Court settled a
long standing conflict among the circuits concerning the right of the taxpayer
to intervene.
In Donaldson, the Internal Revenue Service issued a summons to the
former employer of the taxpayer whose tax liability was under investigation.
In addition, a second summons was issued to Acme's accountant (Mercurio).
The summonses ordered the witnesses to appear, give testimony and produce
records relating to the taxpayer's tax liability. The taxpayer neither owned
nor possessed any proprietary interest in the records which the summonses
required the witnesses to produce. Both witnesses were willing to comply
with their respective summons. However, the taxpayer obtained a restraining
order which prohibited the witnesses from so doing "until such time as an
order of a court of competent jurisdiction has been issued requiring such
14
compliance.1'
The internal revenue agent who had issued the summonses then filed
petitions for their judicial enforcement pursuant to sections 7402(b) and
7604(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. Orders to show cause why the witnesses should not be compelled to comply with the summonses were issued
by the district court. In response thereto, the taxpayer moved to intervene
in the enforcement proceedings and to challenge the summonses on the
ground that they were issued for an improper purpose (i.e., issued solely for
the purpose of gathering evidence of any violations of the criminal tax laws
which the taxpayer may have violated). The taxpayer based these motions
on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.24(a)(2) 15 and Reisman v. Caplin.16
In deciding Reisman in 1964, the Court had held that"... in the event
the taxpayer is not a party to the summons before the hearing officer, he
13. 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
14. Id. at 520.
15. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2):
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action . . . (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action
and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede his ability to protect his interest unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by the existing parties.
16. 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
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• . . may intervene."' 17 This language had led several of the circuits to hold
that the taxpayer under investigation had an absolute right to intervene in
proceedings to judicially enforce an internal revenue summons issued to a
third party.' 8 Thus, the taxpayer in Donaldson based his motion to intervene on the ground that his right to intervene was absolute. The district
court denied the motion to intervene and ordered the witnesses to appear before the internal revenue agent and to produce the documents required by
the summonses. The orders were affirmed on appeal' 9 and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court held that the taxpayer's right to intervene in proceedings to enforce a summons issued to a third party was not absolute. In
so holding, the Court noted that while the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
are applicable to summons proceedings by virtue of Rule 81(a)(3), 20 the
Federal Rules are not inflexible. The Court pointed out that Rule 81(a)
(3) specifically limited its own operation to summons proceedings by providing that, the "district court, by local rule or by order, may limit the applica' 21
tions of the rules in a summons proceeding."
Similarly, the Court found that the language in Reisman did not guarantee the right of intervention, but was intended to mean that the taxpayer
could intervene only where the district court determined that his intervention
was appropriate. 22 The Court went on to explain that intervention by the
taxpayer was appropriate where he had a "significantly protectable interest."' 23 While the Court did not attempt to list all of the instances where the
taxpayer's intervention would be appropriate, it would appear that where the
taxpayer owned or possessed some proprietary interest in the records which
the summons required to be produced, the taxpayer would be allowed to intervene. 24 Furthermore, the Court recognized that where the records sought
by the summons were protected by the attorney-client privilege or where it
was shown that the summonses which required the production were issued
for an improper purpose, the taxpayer would be allowed to intervene. 25
17. Id. at 449.
18. United States v. Benford, 406 F.2d 1192, 1194 (7th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Bank of Commerce, 405 F.2d 931 (3rd Cir. 1969); Justice v. United States,
365 F.2d 312, 314 (6th Cir. 1966).
19. United States v. Mercurio, 418 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1969), afr'd sub nom.
Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1970).
20. Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(3):
. . . These rules apply to proceedings to compel the giving of testimony or
production of documents in accordance with a subpoena issued by an officer
or agency of the United States under any statute of the United States except
as otherwise provided by statute or by rules of the district court or by order
of the court in the proceedings.
21. 400 U.S. at 528-529; see note 18 supra.
22. Id. at 529.
23. ld. at 531.
24. Id. at 530.
25. Id.
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III.

ISSUANCE OF THE SUMMONS FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE
OF ASCERTAINING CRIMINAL LIABILITY

In United States v. Powell,2 6 the Supreme Court listed the requirements
that the Government must meet in order to obtain judicial enforcement of
27
summonses issued pursuant to section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code.
At the top of the list was the requirement that the Government "must show
28
that the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose.
Section 7602 authorizes the Internal Revenue Service to issue a summons for
the purpose of:
. . . ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return
where none has been made, or determining the liability of any
person for any internal revenue tax ....
On its face section 7602 does not authorize the issuance of an internal revenue summons in furtherance of a criminal tax investigation. However, it is
well established that where the purpose of the investigation is to determine
the taxpayer's civil tax liability, the fact that the information may also lead
to a criminal prosecution for violation of tax laws does not render the investigation improper. 29 In short, the investigation is lawful as long as its purpose
is not solely to determine criminal liability. Thus, the following question is
raised: at what point does an investigation, which was initiated to determine
both civil and criminal liability, become improper because its purpose has become solely the determination of criminal liability?
As will be recalled, in Donaldson the taxpayer sought to challenge the
summons on the ground that the investigation by the Internal Revenue Service was for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution, thus rendering the summons invalid. The taxpayer based this assertion on the following dictum from Reisman:
The witness may challenge the summons on any appropriate
ground. This would include, as the circuits have held, the defenses that the material is sought for the improper purpose of obtaining evidence for use in a criminal prosecution, Boren v. Tucker,
239 F.2d 767, 772-773, as well as that it is protected by the at-

torney-client privilege.

....30

26. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
27. Id. at 57-58.
"[The Government] ... must show that the investigation
will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to

the purpose, that the information sought is not already within the Commissioner's
possession and that the administrative steps required by the Code have been followed ......
28. Id.
29. United States v. Giordano, 419 F.2d 564, 568 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,

397 U.S. 1037 (1970); United States v. Hayes, 408 F.2d 932, 936 (7th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 835 (1969); United States v. DeGrossa, 405 F.2d 926, 928
(3rd Cir. 1969), cert. denied, Zudick v. United States, 394 U.S. 973 (1969); Venn
v. United States, 400 F.2d 207, 210 (5th Cir. 1968); Wild v. United States, 362
F.2d 206, 209 (9th Cir. 1966); McGarry v. Riley, 363 F.2d 421, 424 (1st Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 969 (1966).

30. 400 U.S. at 532, quoting Reisman v. United States, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964).
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The taxpayer contended that the agents who had issued the summonses were
assigned to the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service, and
that since the Intelligence Division was responsible for investigating criminal
violations of the tax laws, the purpose of the investigation was solely crimi1
nal.3
The Court rejected this argument and held that "an internal revenue
summons may be issued in aid of an investigation if it is issued in good faith
and prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution. ' 32 While noting
that each district office of the Internal Revenue Service has a Criminal Division as well as an Audit Division, the Court refused to draw the line which
distinguishes a civil investigation from an investigation solely for criminal
purposes at the appearance of a special agent from the Criminal Division.
The Court recognized that the special agent "may well conduct his investigation jointly with the agent from the Audit Division."' 33 Therefore, the investigation would not be solely for criminal purposes. The Court further explained that the Reisman dictum must be read in light of its citation of Boren
v. Tuckner.34 Boren held that as long as a taxpayer under investigation was
not under indictment and prosecution had not been recommended, the summons could not be challenged on the ground that it was issued solely to determine criminal liability.35
The effect of the Donaldson holding was apparent in United States v.
6
In Troupe, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that
the fact an investigation was being conducted solely by a special agent from
the Criminal Division of the Internal Revenue Service was not controlling in
determining whether the investigation was being conducted for joint civil and
criminal purposes or solely for criminal purposes. Rather, the court of appeals held that since no criminal proceeding was pending against the taxpayer
and since none had been recommended, the summons had been issued for a
37
proper purpose and would be enforced.
Troupe.3

Thus, the effect of the Donaldson holding is clear and leaves no room for
interpretation. An Internal Revenue summons may not be challenged on the
ground that it was issued solely to determine criminal tax liability unless
there is a showing that the taxpayer under investigation is under indictment
or that the Internal Revenue Service has recommended prosecution to the
Justice Department.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
1971).

Id. at 521.
Id. at 536.
Id. at 535.
239 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1956).
Id. at 772-773.
438 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 119; accord, United States v. Kyriaco, 326 F. Supp. 1184 (C.D. Cal.
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IV.

PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

It is well settled that the privilege against self-incrimination may be invoked in civil proceedings, including investigations, as well as in criminal
proceedings. 38 Specifically, it has been held that constitutional privileges
may be invoked in proceedings authorized by section 7602 of the Internal
Revenue Code.3 9 However, the privilege against self-incrimination may not
40
be asserted as a blanket objection to an internal revenue summons.
Rather, the witness must appear before the revenue examiner and assert the
privilege only as to records named in the summons and as to questions asked
by the examiner which the witness feels present "substantial and 'real,' not
merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination." '4'

Any records that the witness has failed to produce and any questions
that he has failed to answer in reliance on his fifth amendment rights can, of
course, be the subject of an action in the district court to enforce the summons. 42 At these proceedings, the district court will review the records and
testimony to which the witness claims the privilege and determine whether
the claim is well-founded. 43 In determining the witness' claim, the district
court will examine the circumstances surrounding the claim and the likelihood
that his production of the records or his testimony, if compelled, would tend
44
to incriminate him.

Since the privilege against self-incrimination is purely personal, it is
well settled that it can not be invoked by corporations or by their officers
where the summons calls for the production of corporate books and records. 45
This rule has been applied even where the person required to produce corporate records was the sole stockholder in the corporation. 4 6 However,
where the production of books and records of unincorporated associations is
required, the rule is not so clear. In United States v. White,4 7 the United
38.
(1924).

In Re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 226 U.S. 34

39. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964).
40. Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968); Marchetti v. United States,
390 U.S. 39 (1968); United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1969).
41.

Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374 (1951).

42. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7604(a).

See, Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440,

445-446 (1964).

43. United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.3d 845, 852 (5th Cir. 1969); Daly v.
United States, 393 F.2d 873, 878 (8th Cir. 1968); Warnell v. United States, 291
F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1961); Landry v. United States, 283 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 845 (1961).
44. In Re U.S. Hoffman Can Corp., 373 F.2d 622 (3rd Cir. 1969).
45. United States v. Giordano, 419 F.2d 564, 569 (8th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Christensen, 356 F.2d 988 (3rd Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 962
(1966); Siegel v. Tyson, 331 F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v. Crespo, 281
F. Supp. 928, 936-937 (D. Md. 1968); United States v. Lawhon, 288 F. Supp. 669,
670 (S.D. Fla. 1967).

46. Wild v. Brewer, 329 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1964).
47. 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
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States Supreme Court held that the criterion for determining when an individual may claim the privilege to prevent the production of books and records
of an unincorporated association was:
. . . whether one can fairly say under all the circumstances that a
particular type of organization has a charcter so impersonal in the
scope of its membership and activities that it can not be said to
embody or represent the purely private or personal interests of its
but rather to embody their common or group interest
constituents,
48
only.

In short, the nature and make-up of the unincorporated association determine whether the privilege may be asserted.
Where the association is composed of many members and its activities
are extensive, the privilege against self-incrimination may not be asserted by
one who is in possession of the association's books and records when he is di-

rected to produce them. 49 Thus, in United States v. Silverstein,5" the White

criterion was applied, and a general partner in five limited partnerships
(which partnerships had from 25 to 147 limited partners) was required to
produce the books and records of the partnerships. However, in common
partnership situations, where there is joint ownership and "a standard partnership pattern of joint and several powers and responsibilities," the privilege
may be asserted by all of the partners or any one of them. 5 1 The fact that
the privilege against self-incrimination is personal also prohibits the addressee of an internal revenue summons from asserting another's fifth amendment privilege. 52 Thus, a third person to whom a summons has been issued
(e.g., an accountant) may not set up the fact that the production of books in
his possession will incriminate the taxpayer who is under investigation.
However, until recently, there was authority for the proposition that a
taxpayer could intervene and assert his privilege against self-incrimination
as a challenge to an internal revenue summons issued to his accountant where
the taxpayer was the owner of records which were in the possession of the
5
accountant and which the summons directed the accountant to produce. 3
This authority was grounded in language of the United States Supreme Court
in United States v. White, 54 where the Court had held:
48. Id. at 696.
49. McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372 (1960); Rogers v. United States,
340 U.S. 367 (1951); United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349 (1950).
50. 314 F.2d 789 (2nd Cir. 1963).
51. United States v. Cogan, 257 F. Supp. 270, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
52. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 704 (1944); United States v. Merrell,
303 F. Supp. 490, 493 (N.D.N.Y. 1969).
53. Stuart v. United States, 416 F.2d 459, 463 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Tsukuno, 341 F. Supp. 839 (N.D. Ill. 1972); United States v. Pizzo, 260 F. Supp.
216, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Dorfman v. Rombs, 218 F. Supp. 905, 906 (N.D. Ill.
1963).
54. 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
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. . . the papers and effects which the privilege protects must be
the private property of the person claiming the55privilege, or at least
in his possession in a purely personal capacity.
Therefore, the question of the taxpayer's assertion of the privilege when the
summons was issued to a third person turned on the question of the taxpayer's ownership of the records which the summons had required the third per56
son to produce.
However, this view was not adhered to by all of the circuits. Some circuits took the position that an owner, who was not in possession of records,
could not assert his fifth amendment privilege to challenge a summons ordering production of the records by the person who had possession. 57 This conflict was settled in January, 1973, when the United States Supreme Court
decided Couch v. Jennings.5" That decision makes it clear that the basis for
invoking the privilege against self-incrimination has become solely a question
of possession.
In Couch, the taxpayer under investigation had, for a period of fifteen
years, handed over all bank statements, payroll records, and report of sales
and expenditures to her accountant. It is important to note that while the
taxpayer had put these records into the possession of her accountant, there
was no question that she had retained title to the records. It is also important
to note that the accountant was not a personal employee of the taxpayer.
Rather, he was an independent contractor with his own office and many
other clients.
During an investigation of the taxpayer's tax returns, an agent from the
Audit Division examined records in the possession of the accountant which
belonged to the taxpayer. This examination was made with the accountant's
permission. The examination disclosed a substantial understatement of gross
income. This finding was reported to the Intelligence Division and a special
agent was assigned to conduct an investigation into the possibility of the taxpayer's criminal liability. The agent from the Audit Division continued to
investigate possible civil liability. Subsequently, the special agent issued a
summons to the accountant requiring him to produce:
All books, records, bank statements, cancelled checks, deposit
ticket copies, workpapers and all other pertinent documents pertaining to the tax liability of the above taxpayer.5 9
On the return day of the summons, the special agent went to the accountant's
office to inspect the records and was informed that, at the taxpayer's request,
55. Id. at 699.
56. United States

v.

Cote, 326 F. Supp. 444, 450-451 (D. Minn. 1971), a!f'd,

456 F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1972).
57. United States v. Couch, 449 F.2d 141 (4th Cir. 1971), affd, 41 U.S.L.W.
4107 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1973); United States v. Schoeberlein, 335 F. Supp. 1048, 1055
(D. Md. 1971); United States v. Pizzo, 260 F. Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
58. 41 U.S.L.W. 4107 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1973).

59. Id. at 4108.
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the accountant had delivered the records to the taxpayer's attorney. 60
Thereupon, the special agent petitioned the district court for enforcement of
the summons.

The taxpayer then moved to intervene. Since her ownership of the records provided the necessary proprietary interest, her intervention was permitted. In so doing, she contended that her ownership of the records provided a basis from which the claim of her privilege against self-incrimination
could be asserted to bar the production of the records in the possession of her
accountant. The issue presented was:
. . . whether her proprietary interest (i.e., her ownership) . . .
enables her to assert successfully a privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination to bar enforcement of the summons and production of the records despite the fact that the records no longer remained in her possession. 1
The Court held that possession and not ownership is the criterion on
which an assertion of fifth amendment privilege must be based and pointed
out that the right against self-incrimination protects against "extortion of information from the accused himself."'62 The information sought by the summons in Couch was being elicited not from the taxpayer but from her accountant. Thus, the Court reasoned, the element of "personal compulsion
against the accused"6' 3 was lacking. Therefore, her personal privilege
against self-incrimination could not be asserted to prevent the production of
the documents in the possession of her accountant.
Although it was held that under the factual situation presented in
Couch, the taxpayer could not assert her fifth amendment privilege, because
she was not in possession of the records, the Court did recognize that under
certain circumstances, the owner of documents may retain a constructive possession sufficient to enable the privilege to be invoked.6 4 Although the
Court did not establish any guidelines to aid in determining when the owner
has retained constructive possession, the factual situation of Couch may provide some direction.
As will be recalled, the taxpayer had delivered possession of her records to her accountant over a period of fifteen years. Furthermore, the accountant's status was that of an independent contractor who had many other
60. The fact that the records were transferred to the possession of the taxpayer's attorney after the summons was issued neither operates to change the rights
and obligations of any of the parties nor does it destroy the effect of the summons.
"The rights and obligations of the parties became fixed when the summons was
served, and the transfer did not alter them." 41 U.S.L.W. at 4109, n. 9; see, United
States v. Zakutansky, 401 F.2d 68, 72 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1021
(1969); United States v. Lyons, 442 F.2d 1144, 1146 (1st Cir. 1971).
61. Couch v. Jennings, 41 U.S.L.W. at 4109.
62. id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 4111.
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clients; therefore, it could not be claimed that the accountant was the taxpayer's personal employee. The Court observed that these facts indicated
that the taxpayer had completely divested herself of the possession of the
records.6 5 This observation by the Court does not provide any well defined
guidelines in determining when the owner of records has retained constructive
possession of the records so as to be able to assert his privilege against selfincrimination. However, it does establish that where the indicia of the relinquishment of possession is not so obvious as it was in Couch, the
same result need not follow. For example, in Stuart v. United States,66 a
suspect had transferred possession of records to an accountant for the sole
purpose of providing a more convenient time and place to examine the records. It was held that the suspect had retained constructive possession of
the records and that his privilege against self-incrimination could be asserted
to bar the production of the records by the accountant.
There are many situations where the indicia of relinquishment of possession will not be as apparent as they were in Couch or where the retention
of constructive possession will not be as apparent as it was in Stuart. By not
attempting to enumerate specific instances where the retention of constructive possession gives way to the relinquishment of possession, the Court recognized that this determination must be made on the basis of the factual
finding in each case wherein the question is presented. Furthermore, it must
be remembered that the determination of possesion is not an end in itself.
Rather, it is a means employed to determine upon whom "physical or moral
compulsion is being exerted" 67 to produce the records. Only the person
who is the subject of that compulsion has a basis for asserting the privilege.0 8
V.

THE STATE STATUTORY ACCOUNTANT-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

Federal law does not provide for an accountant-client privilege;6 9 however, Illinois does provide for a statutory accountant-client privilege. 70 Thus,
the question is raised as to whether a state statutory accountant-client privilege may be invoked to challenge an internal revenue summons issued to the
accountant of the taxpayer under investigation. In United States v. Tsukuno,71 an internal revenue summons was issued to an accountant directing
him to produce records and documents in his possession relating to the tax
65. id.
66. 416 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1969).
67. 41 U.S.L.W. at 4111, quoting Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 15

(1918).

68. Id.
69. Couch v. Jennings, 41 U.S.L.W. at 4111.
70. Ill.
Rev. Stat. ch. 110 1 ,51 (1971):
A public accountant shall not be required by any court to divulge information or evidence which has been obtained by him in his confidential capacity
as a public accountant.
71. 341 F. Supp. 839 (N.D. Ill.
1972).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

liability of one of his clients. The taxpayer was allowed to intervene, and
both he and the accountant invoked the Illinois statutory accountant-client
privilege as a challenge to the summons. The district court held that federal
law recognizes no confidential accountant-client privilege and since questions of privilege in proceedings authorized by the Internal Revenue Code
are determined by federal law,7 2 a state accountant-client privilege could not
7
be invoked to challenge the summons.
Although no accountant-client privilege can be asserted to challenge an
internal revenue summons, there are instances where the work papers of an
accountant or statements made to him may fall within the protection of the
attorney-client privilege. Thus, where the taxpayer under investigation has
made statements or given possession of records to an accountant at the direction of an attorney, the attorney-client privilege may be used as a bar to a
summons requiring the accountant to produce the records. Before the attorney-client privilege may be invoked in this situation, several requirements
must be met. The communication to the accountant must have been made
for the purpose of obtaining legal advice from an attorney. 74 In addition,
the communication must have been made in confidence. 75 For example, in
Bauer v. Orser,76 the taxpayers first retained an attorney for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice concerning their tax returns. The attorney, in turn,
retained an accountant. At the direction of the attorney, the taxpayers delivered possession of records to the accountant in order that he might perform accounting services which would better enable the attorney to render
legal advice. Subsequently, a summons was issued to the accountant directing him to produce work papers which related to the taxpayer's tax liability.
The district court held that since the taxpayers had given the information
contained in the work papers to the accountant to better enable the attorney
to render legal advice and since the attorney had assured them that the information would be kept confidential, the accountant's work papers fell
within the attorney-client privilege.
Although under these circumstances the attorney-client privilege may be
invoked to protect information and documents in the possession of an accountant, it is important to note that the privilege can be waived by a subsequent disclosure of the information. Thus, where the information communicated to the accountant at the direction of the attorney is subsequently transcribed onto amended tax returns and filed with the Government, the privi72. Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 723, 742 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 864 (1953).
73. United States v. Tsukuno, 341 F. Supp. 839, 844 (N.D. Ill. 1972); see,
Couch v. Jennings, 41 U.S.L.W. at 4111; Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795, 806
(9th Cir. 1954); United States v. White, 326 F. Supp. 459, 462 (S.D. Tex. 1971).

74. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2nd Cir. 1961).
75. Id.
76. 258 F. Supp. 338 (D. N.D. 1966).
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lege is deemed to have been waived. 7 7 Furthermore, 'the subsequent disclosure waives the privilege, not only as to the information actually disclosed,
78
but also to "the details underlying the information" actually disclosed.
VI.

THE

FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE

Section 7602(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, in order to comply
with the fourth amendment, provides that the Internal Revenue Service is
authorized to inspect only those documents which are relevant and material
to the tax liability of the taxpayer under investigation. 79 Similarly, section
7605(b) provides that taxpayers shall not be subjected to unnecessary examinations and that taxpayer's records shall only be inspected once a year
unless the taxpayer is notified in writing that an additional inspection is necessary. 80 In order to stay within the limits established by these sections and
the fourth amendment, the Government must show that the inspection of the
documents named in the summons is necessary and that the documents are
relative and material to the tax liability of the taxpayer under investigation.
Thus, the question is raised as to the tests to be applied in determining necessity and relevance.
In United States v. Powell,8 the tax liability of a corporation for the
years 1958 and 1959 was under investigation. An internal revenue summons was issued to the president of the corporation. The corporation's returns had once been previously examined, and the statute of limitations
barred the assessment of additional deficiencies for 1958 and 1959, except
in the case of fraud. Given these facts, the president of the corporation contended that section 7605(b) was applicable and that the section's reference
to necessity required that the Government show that probable cause for suspecting fraud existed before the summons could be judicially enforced. In
short, he contended that the section required that in order to show that a
re-examination was "necessary" within the meaning of section 7605(b), the
Government must show probable cause to suspect that fraud existed in the
tax returns filed for 1958 and 1959.
The Court rejected this interpretation of the section and held that the
power of the Internal Revenue Service to investigate was not dependent
upon a showing of probable cause. Rather, the Court analogized the investigatory powers of the Internal Revenue Service with the investigatory powers
77. United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 144-145 (8th Cir. 1972).
78. Id. at 145.
79. See note 1 supra.
80.

Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7605(b):

No taxpayer shall be subjected to unnecessary examination or investigations,

and only one inspection of a taxpayer's books of account shall be made for
each taxable year unless the taxpayer requests otherwise or unless the Secre-

tary or his delegate, after investigation, notifies the taxpayer in writing that
an additional inspection is necessary.
81. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
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of other administrative agencies. In so doing, the Court noted that the Federal Trade Commission had the power to "investigate merely on the suspicion
that the law is being violated or even just because it wants the assurance that
it is not."18 2 Thus, the Court held that in order to obtain judicial enforcement of its summonses, the Internal Revenue Service need only show "that
the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the
inquiry may be relevant to the purpose, that the information sought is not already within the Commissioner's possession, and that the administrative steps
required by the Code have been followed." 83
As should be noted, the second Powell requirement that the Government must meet in order to obtain judicial enforcement of a summons is the
same requirement which is imposed on the Government by section 7602(a)
(1) of the Internal Revenue Code. That requirement is that the information or the records sought by the summons must be relevant to the matter
under investigation (i.e., tax liability of the taxpayer under investigation).
The test of relevance applied by the district courts in determining whether a
summons will be judicially enforced is "whether the inspection sought might
throw some light upon the correctness of the taxpayer's returns."'8 4 In explaining this test in United States v. Harrington,8 5 the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit noted that the protection provided by the judicial proceedings in the district courts "against the sweeping or irrelevant order is particularly appropriate in matters where the demand for records is directed not to
the taxpayer but to a third party who may have had some dealing with the
person under investigation." 88 The court then went on to explain:
. . . the Government may not defend a failure to indicate suffi-

cient relationship of records to the investigation solely on the basis
that some possibility of relation remains and no one can discern
more until after examination. .

.

.

The question, and it is not

one that lends itself easily to solution, is whether from what the
government already knows there exists the requisite nexus between
the taxpayer and records of another's affairs to make the investigation reasonable-in short, whether the 'might' in the articulated
standard, 'might throw some light upon the correctness of the return,' is in the particular circumstances an indication of a realistic
expectation
rather than an idle hope that something may be dis7
covered.8
This explanation facilitates the application of the test by providing a somewhat more objective standard. To be sure, the test of relevance remains
82. Id. at 57, quoting United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-643
(1949).
83. 379 U.S. at 57, 58.
84. United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 523 (2nd Cir. 1968); Foster
v. United States, 265 F.2d 183, 186-187 (2nd Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912
(1960).
85. 388 F.2d 520 (2nd Cir. 1968).
86. Id. at 523.
87. Id. at 524.
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broad and much discretion is left in the hands of the district court."" However, by providing that the Government must have a "realistic expectation"
that the records of a third person will "throw some light" upon the tax liability
of the taxpayer under investigation, the Harrington explanation of the test
precludes the Internal Revenue Service from issuing summonses to third parties in the blind hope that information bearing on the tax liability of the taxpayer under investigation will turn up. Similarly, the requirement, that the
Government already know that there is a connection between the taxpayer
under investigation and the records of the third party would seem to indicate that internal revenue summonses issued to professional tax preparers,
requiring them to produce all documents which reflect the names, addresses,
and social security numbers of all persons for whom the tax preparer prepared Federal Income Tax Returns, 9 could be successfully challenged on
the ground that the information sought by the summons was not relevant to
the tax liability of any taxpayer under investigation.
Finally, it should be noted that the fourth amendment can be invoked
to bar the judicial enforcement of an internal revenue summons whose overbreadth creates an onerous burden on the person to whom it is issued. The
determination of whether a burden is imposed on the addressee is essentially
a balancing process in which the district court may exercise broad discretion.9 0 The district court must weigh the inconvenience and expense to
which the addressee would be put in complying with the summons against
the Government's legitimate interest in obtaining information relevant to the
tax liability of the taxpayer under investigation. 9
Where there is no reasonable alternative to the procedure for inspection specified in the summons,
the district court has the power to refuse to enforce compliance. 9 2 Since the
district court has broad discretion in protecting the addressee of the summons
against oppressive procedures, the court may include in the order to enforce
the summons appropriate limitations as to the time and place where the docu93
ments can be examined.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Probably the thread that runs through the discussion of the challenges
which can be made to prevent judicial enforcement of the internal revenue
summons is the fact that the basis from which challenges may be asserted
88.

United States v. Ruggeiro, 425 F.2d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 1970).

89. For an example of this situation see, Alexander Hamilton Institute, Taxes
Interpreted, Special Bulletin (October 24, 1972).

At this point, it should also be

noted that internal revenue summonses do not purport to be search warrants and do
not justify the seizure of documents by internal revenue agents. Lord v. Kelley,
334 F.2d 742, 743-744 (1st Cir. 1964).
90. Dunn v. Ross, 356 F.2d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 1966).
91. United States v. First National Bank of Fort Smith, Arkansas, 173 F. Supp.
716, 721 (W.D. Ark. 1959).
92. Id.
93. Dunn v. Ross, 356 F.2d at 667.
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have been continually limited by the Supreme Court. The broad language
of Reisman v. Caplin,9 4 which led several circuits to hold that the taxpayer
under investigation had an absolute right to intervene and challenge a summons issued to a third party, was explained away in Donaldson v. United
States.9 5 After Donaldson, the taxpayer under investigation could intervene
only where he had some proprietary interest in the documents which the
summons required the third party to produce, or where the district court determined that he had some significantly protectable interest which could not
be protected unless he were allowed to intervene. In addition, Donaldson
made it clear that the taxpayer's intervention to assert the challenge that the
summons had been issued solely to determine criminal liability was proper
only where the taxpayer had shown that he was under indictment or that the
Internal Revenue Service had recommended prosecution to the Justice Department.
Similarly, the taxpayer's fifth amendment privilege was limited in Couch
v. Jennings,96 where the Court held that ownership alone provided no basis
from which the taxpayer could assert his fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination where an internal revenue summons had been issued to a
third party in possession of documents owned by the taxpayer. Rather, the
taxpayer could assert his fifth amendment privilege only where he had retained actual or constructive possession of the documents which the summons required the third party to produce.
In determining what showing of necessity must be made in order to obtain judicial enforcement of an internal revenue summons, United States v.
Powel197 held that the Government need make no showing of probable cause.
Rather, the Government need only show that the documents required to be
produced by the summons were relevant to the tax liability of the taxpayer
under investigation.
With the possible exception of the Couch holding, the limitations placed
on the challenges to the internal revenue summons seem to be based, at least
in part, on the policy determination that the Internal Revenue Service should
be as free as possible to carry out investigations which it determines are warranted. 8 Thus, the Court has seen fit to give the Internal Revenue Service
a free hand in conducting its investigations unless the investigation is clearly
an abuse of the powers granted by the Internal Revenue Code, or where the
investigation and the summons issued in furtherance of that investigation are
clearly violative of Constitutional guarantees.
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